Bob McCarty Writes

The side effects of the U.S. Senate ratifying the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea Treaty (a.k.a., “L.O.S.T.”) will make dealing with Somali pirates look like child’s play.

Ship hijackings on the rise off the Somali coast.

Unfortunately, such action seems almost inevitable now that Democrats are about to seize control of both the legislative and executive branches of the federal government.   In a world where few differences exist between Somali pirates and those in government, ratification of the treaty — or, in my words, “Getting L.O.S.T.” — portends some truly frightening scenarios in our nation’s future.

First, the child’s play — Somalia.

In the closing paragraph of their Wall Street Journal article, Pirates Exploit Confusion About International Law, David B. Rivkin Jr. and Lee A Casey captured the gravity of the Somali situation:

As in the war on terror, the new campaign against piracy will test the mettle of Western governments. It will also require them to balance the rights of lawbreakers against the indisputable rights of the law-abiding to not live their lives in danger and fear.

Unfortunately, because they failed to incorporate the impact of L.O.S.T., the WSJ writers came up a bit short of the August 2006 effort by David A. Ridenour, vice president of the National Center for Public Policy Research.  In the conclusion of his article on the subject, Ridenour summed up the terms of L.O.S.T. that will do more than simply impact lawbreakers on the high seas:

Sufficient concerns about the implications for U.S. national security and U.S. environmental policy exist that the United States should be wary of acceding to the Law of the Sea Treaty.

These concerns, in summary, include:

Article 20 would extend the surfacing requirement to vessels not covered under previous conventions, including those that would otherwise qualify for innocent passage such as unmanned vessels used for mine detection and other purposes.

The Law of the Sea Treaty would impede the U.S.’s ability to capture international terrorists and confiscate weapons of mass destruction through detention of ships on the high seas.  The treaty specifies that the boarding of ship is not justified except when a ship is believed to be engaged in piracy, unauthorized broadcasting, drug trafficking, is obscuring its nationality or shows no nationality.  Detention of ships in a manner other than those prescribed in the treaty would subject such actions to the judgment of the International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea in Hamburg, Germany.

Article 88’s stipulation that “the high seas shall be reserved for peaceful purposes” and Article 301’s requirement that parties to the convention refrain from “any threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state” may be used to impede U.S. military operations at sea.  The Treaty’s opt-out provisions for military activities would only free the U.S. from the requirement to participate in a specific dispute resolution process, not dispute resolution itself.

These days, it’s fashionable in conservative circles to ask, “What would Reagan do?”  When it comes to L.O.S.T., many believe Ronald Reagan would still reject it.

Sadly, current leaders — and I use that term loosely — of freedom-loving countries, who claim to be “powerless to act” on matters such as those involving Somali pirates, are likely to face much greater challenges in the foreseeable future if or when L.O.S.T. becomes a reality.  Stay tuned!

U.S. Navy photo above by Aviation Warfare Systems Operator 2nd Class William S. Stevens.

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For previous BMW posts about L.O.S.T., see my posts of July 7, 2007, and Oct. 31, 2007.

For previous posts about Somali pirates, click here.