Bob McCarty Writes

By Bob McCarty

Copyright © 2009 Bob McCarty Writes.  All rights reserved.  To request reprint permission, send an e-mail to BobMcCartyWrites (at) gmail (dot) com.

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A controversy with life-and-death implications has been brewing for 12 months over the Army’s decision to deploy the Preliminary Credibility Assessment Screening System, a hand-held lie detector, to combat zones.

One critic of the decision believes a high-tech “turf war” resulted in Army leaders opting to deploy the PCASS devices.  As a result of that internal dispute, he believes the lives of combat troops have been placed at greater-than-necessary risk.

Based upon my experience in dealing with Army officials during the past two days, I’m inclined to believe he’s right.

QUESTIONS ABOUT PCASS

Questions about PCASS surfaced in my mind yesterday after I was reminded of the one-year anniversary of the Army’s decision to purchase 94 of the lie detectors from Lafayette Instrument Company of Lafayette, Ind., at a cost of $7,500 each. According to an MSNBC.com report published one year ago today, the devices were due to be shipped to Afghanistan within the month.

In e-mails to both Army public affairs officers at the Pentagon and officials at Lafayette Instrument Wednesday morning, I forwarded the six questions below in hopes of learning whether or not the PCASS had proven the decision to be a wise one:

Q1: How many of the initial-purchase PCASS devices were deployed and in which countries were they deployed?

Q2: How frequently was the PCASS device used in the field during the past year?

Q3: After one year of use, does the Army consider the PCASS device effective?  If so, please explain why.  If not, why not?

Q4: Does the Army have plans to continue, expand or otherwise modify the use of PCASS devices in the field?  If so, please describe.  If not, why?

Q5: Has the use of the PCASS device been credited with directly saving any American lives or thwarting any enemy operations?

Q6: Is there anything else noteworthy about the PCASS?  Please explain.

Not unexpectedly, the folks at Lafayette Instrument referred me to the Pentagon.

Similarly, I didn’t expect Army officials to provide answers to questions #2 and #4, since — understandably, I might add — soldiers who deal with operational issues don’t like to share details in public for fear they’ll be discovered by their adversaries.  I did, however, expect them to provide timely answers to #1, #3, #5 and #6 as those answers would, at a minimum, afford the Army an opportunity to appear responsive.

Thirty-three minutes after I sent the questions, Lt. Col. Christopher Garver replied, writing in an e-mail, “We’ll take a look at this and see if we can find someone to talk to you about it.”

More than six and a half hours later, I received an e-mail from Dave Foster, an Army civilian PAO.  He wrote:

“…your query is being worked on two fronts with an expectation of a response by mid-day Thursday.  I sincerely appreciate your patience as we work to provide you with as much information as we can in response to your query.”

Twenty minutes before Noon Central today, I sent a follow-up message, reminding Foster of his “mid-day” promise and asking if he would be providing answers soon. Eighteen minutes later, Foster sent a measured response, saying he did not anticipate hearing anything from officials at U.S. Central Command “until tomorrow at the earliest and perhaps early next week.”

As an Air Force public affairs officer for more than six years, I dealt with news reporters and producers on a daily basis and became very familiar with the way things work when questions about sensitive and/or controversial topics.  I understand the pressures faced by the Army PAOs as they attempt to obtain answers to my questions about PCASS.  Because of the delay in obtaining answers to any of my questions, I find myself leaning toward the conclusion that a turf war within the Army resulted in a decision that, for a year now, has placed the lives of combat troops at greater-than-necessary risk.

CRITICISM OF PCASS

One critic of PCASS is Jim Kane, executive director of the National Institute for Truth Verification, who claims emphatically that PCASS was never tested for countermeasures before it was deployed to troops in the field.  He adds that it was the success of his South Florida-based company’s more-accurate and versatile Computer Voice Stress Analyzer® technology in Iraq and Afghanistan that led the Defense Department to create the PCASS system.

“They needed something to issue to troops in the field who used the CVSA and whose commanders — including some general officers — supported the CVSA,” Kane explained.

Admittedly, Kane has an interest in the success of NITV products, but that’s not all that drives this retired Army Chief Warrant Officer 5 whose bio on the NITV web site reflects more than 30 years of diverse intelligence experience.  It is his sense of patriotism and genuine concern for protecting the troops that he says drives him to want the best for them.

One of the things that causes him stress is the injection of intra-Army politics — between those in the polygraph community and those pushing new technology — into the equation.

“The demand for our system was so great that the DoD polygraphers had to take some action or they would have been put out of business by the CVSA,” he explained. “Their resistance to CVSA is doing great damage to our national security by keeping it from the war fighters who need it the most.”

Editor’s Note: If/when I receive answers to the questions above from the Army, I will post those answers in an update on this blog.

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UPDATE #1: 04/10/2009 at 8:12 a.m. Central – Still no answers from the Army, and one thing to mention.  In my original post, I failed to mention that I had contacted two well-known milbloggers, Matthew “Blackfive” Burden (former paratrooper and Army officer) and Michael Yon, to see if they had any input about the PCASS.  Neither had heard of the device.

UPDATE #2: 04/10/2009 at 6:35 p.m. Central – Received the note below from an active-duty member of the Special Operations community familiar with the issues at stake:

“The bottom line is that the upper levels of command owe us a product that works. The CVSA has been tested under combat conditions and truly works!  What more proof do they want?”