Bob McCarty Writes

By Bob McCarty

Copyright © 2009 Bob McCarty Writes. All rights reserved. To request reprint permission, send an e-mail to BobMcCartyWrites (at) gmail (dot) com.

Despite the overwhelming success of the Computer Voice Stress Analyzer® while it was used by the U.S. military from 2002-2008, a small group within the Department of Defense bureaucracy — the Defense Academy for Credibility Assessment (formerly known as the DoD Polygraph Institute) — has used its position and influence to block the use of this portable lie detector in combat zones by the military services.  According to a man with a “chip” in the game, their actions are “doing great damage to our national security by keeping it from the war fighters who need it the most.”

That man is Jim Kane, a veteran with more than 30 years experience in military intelligence who now serves as executive director of the National Institute for Truth Verification. His West Palm Beach, Fla.-based company developed CVSA® more than two decades ago, refined it several times and built a large base of support.  That support, it’s important to note, comes not only from within the military intelligence community, but also from end users at more than 1,800 local, state and federal law enforcement agencies who use the technology.

Yesterday, in my post, If Not for Memo, Torture Might Not Be An Issue, I offered a first look at some of the results of my investigation into a DoD “turf war” is keeping the best technology out of the hands of America’s best warfighters and intelligence specialists in places like Afghanistan, Iraq and Guantanamo Bay.

Today, I offer a dozen pieces of evidence that reach across DoD to make a solid argument supporting CVSA® as a better tool than the Preliminary Credibility Assessment Screening System, a cousin to the traditional polygraph, that was designated the “only approved credibility assessment technologies” in the Department of Defense when Under Secretary of Defense James R. Clapper Jr.’s signed a memo to that effect Oct. 29, 2007.

I begin by offering examples of how CVSA® has been used effectively since Sept. 11, 2001:

1.  Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Iraq — From October 2003 to January 2004, a representative of the National Institute for Truth Verification, the West Palm Beach, Fla.-based company behind CVSA®, deployed to and supported truth verification operations in Baghdad.  He conducted approximately 50 CVSA® examinations during this period to include a number of the “top ten” most-wanted former Iraqi leaders.  Through the use of the CVSA®, the NITV representative was able to acquire and verify information from these detainees that no other U.S. government agency was able to obtain.  As a result, the NITV representative received letters from supported military personnel attesting to the success of CVSA®.

2.  U.S. Army, 902d Military Intelligence Group, Iraq — In January 2004, prior to their deployment to Iraq, members of the 902d MI Group underwent training in the CVSA® at Fort Huachuca, Ariz.  Members of the 902d MI Group deployed to Iraq as Task Force Vigilant Freedom and from Jan. 21 to May 11, 2004, successfully used the CVSA® to conduct dozens of examinations before members of the U.S. Army polygraph establishment blocked the further use of the CVSA®.  I am in possession of a series of official reports and documents, obtained via the Freedom of Information Act, originated by the U.S. Army combat personnel who used the CVSA® in Iraq, which attest to the CVSA®’s success and effectiveness, as well as the strong support the U.S. Army field personnel had for the continued use of the CVSA®.

3.  U.S. Marine Corps CI/Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Teams, Camp Pendleton, Calif. — Starting in early 2004, NITV trained more than 80 USMC Tactical CI/HUMINT specialists in the use of the CVSA®.  These teams successfully employed the CVSA® in Iraq from 2004 to 2006.  Based upon pressure by the DoD polygraph establishment, they were ordered to stop using the CVSA® in 2006.

4.  Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Guantanamo Bay, Cuba — From 2005 to 2006, NITV deployed a CVSA® expert to the U.S. detention facilities at Guantanamo Bay to support the interrogation operations of DIA and the U.S. military.  The CVSA® was used more than 100 times and reportedly had a success rate of greater than 90 percent, whereas the polygraph had totally failed at Guantanamo Bay.  In this case, “success rate” is defined as developing new, previously-unknown intelligence which was independently confirmed, or confirming existing information that otherwise could not be verified.  The CVSA® enjoyed an excellent success rate and reputation at GITMO, and was used regularly until the chief of the DIA interrogation unit, Stephen Rodriguez, was reassigned.  Within one week of his reassignment back to DIA headquarters, DoD polygraph leaders flew to Guantanamo Bay, had the use of the CVSA® canceled, and also had NITV’s support contract canceled.  A senior interrogation official at GITMO was so disturbed that he wrote the following in a “To Whom It May Concern” letter: “My opinion based upon my observation is that CVSA is superior to the polygraph when used as a tool in the interrogation process.  Consequently, I conclude that those who wish to remove CVSA from the “interrogator’s tool box” are more interested in protecting their turf than they are in gathering intelligence that protects the American people.”

5.  U.S. Army, Special Forces Groups — From 2005 to 2008, these units conducted more than 1,000 CVSA® examinations. One unit alone, which I’m not at liberty to identify, conducted several hundred exams and documented all of the results.  They reported a 98 percent confirmed accuracy rate with the CVSA®.  Results were documented in intelligence summaries, tactical intelligence reports and counterintelligence reports.

6.  DoD Biometric Evaluation Team — The DoD Biometric Evaluation Team deployed to Iraq in early 2008 to test a suite of biometric technologies, including CVSA®.  The team used the CVSA® during interviews of high-value detainees and had absolute success in employing the CVSA® when other interrogation methods failed.  The team collected significant intelligence by means of the CVSA®, which was provided to the theater commander and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, al of which was documented in written reports.

7.  U.S. Navy Special Warfare Group (U.S. Navy SEALs) — Starting in early 2006, NITV trained more than 50 U.S. Navy SEAL and support personnel in the use of the CVSA®.  Various SEAL teams successfully employed the CVSA® in Iraq from 2006 to 2008.  Based upon pressure by the DoD polygraph establishment and SOCOM J2X (a pro-polygraph Army colonel), they were ordered to stop using the CVSA® in June 2008 after recently acquiring a number of CVSA® systems that were to be issued to SEAL teams  The SEAL Command requested Preliminary Credibility Assessment Screening System (a then-newly-released hand-held polygraph system) training, which they were denied.  The SEAL Command fought this issue, but they were unable to overcome the bureaucratic resistance of the SOCOM J2X and DoD polygraph lobby.

Adding to the body of evidence are instances where Army field manuals, memos and surveys of law enforcement agencies using CVSA® show support for CVSA®.  They appear below:

8. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-24 (MCWP 3-33.5) Counterinsurgency, dated December 2006, authored by Gen. David Petraeus, specifically calls for the use of voice stress analysis and voice patterns to acquire “the measurement and analysis of unique physical or behavioral characteristics” during background screening of foreign persons for counterinsurgency operations.

9.  Army FM 2-22.3, Human Intelligence Collector Operations, dated September 2006, specifically calls for the use of voice stress analysis by U.S. Army HUMINT collectors.  Paragraph 13-7 states:  “Biometric devices such as voice stress analyzer and polygraph support the determination of the truthfulness of a source.”  The paragraph goes on to state that:  “The polygraph is of limited usefulness in general HUMINT collection due to the level of expertise needed to operate it and the lack of general availability of the device to the field.”  Thus, the U.S. Army’s own doctrine establishes the CVSA® as the instrument of choice for tactical HUMINT collectors due to its ease of operation and anticipated availability to tactical-level military intelligence personnel.

10.  Judge Advocate General Memorandum, AOJA, dated Feb. 5, 2007, SUBJECT: “Use of Voice Stress Analyzer,” authorizes the units of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command to acquire and employ the CVSA® as per FM 2-22.3.

11.  U.S. Special Operations Command Survey of CVSA® — In early 2005, SOCOM commissioned an independent survey of U.S. law enforcement CVSA® users to determine the validity of the CVSA® in the field.  Law enforcement agencies in eight states were surveyed by Dr. Gary Gallagher and an assistant.  The result of the survey was an assessed credibility and validity rating for the CVSA® of 91.38 percent.  Despite the positive results of the independent survey, DoD ignored the results and continued to block efforts by the “war fighters” to acquire the CVSA® as a battlefield tool.

12.  DoD Survey of CVSA® — In 2007, based on internal and external pressures, the DoD again conducted a survey of U.S. law enforcement users of the CVSA®.  The results were so positive that the DoD polygraph establishment attempted to bury the report, but finally released it when inquiries were made by a U.S. congressman.  Again, the DoD polygraph community attempted to stop the release of scientifically valid and independently-conducted CVSA® studies/reports that ran counter to their anti-CVSA® agenda.

Unlike polygraph equipment, which many experts — including the National Academy of Sciences (i.e., 2002 report, “The Polygraph and Lie Detection”) — say is unreliable, CVSA® uses a laptop or hand-held computer, proprietary voice stress analysis software and a microphone to achieve extremely-accurate truth verification.

The preponderance of the evidence presented above and in my previous posts suggests the debate over which equipment should be used by DoD agencies is mostly over.  The only question that remains is this:  If it’s not a battle over “turf,” what is it that drives those in the DoD polygraph community to continue their reliance upon PCASS instead of CVSA®?

About the author: Bob McCarty is a former Air Force public affairs officer who blogs full time at  Bob McCarty Writes (www.BobMcCarty.com).

Copyright © 2009 Bob McCarty Writes. All rights reserved. To request reprint permission, send an e-mail to BobMcCartyWrites (at) gmail (dot) com.