Tag Archives: Defense Department

CIA Torture Report Might Be Moot Issue If Not for Clapper

If only people like Director of National Intelligence James R. Clapper Jr. had not worked so hard to ban the use of our most-effective interrogation technology, the use of the words “CIA interrogation techniques” and “torture” in the same sentence would likely not be making headlines around the world today.

Click image above to order a copy of The Clapper Memo.

Click image above to order a copy of The Clapper Memo.

Instead, members of the national and international news media are in a tizzy about the long-awaited and much-anticipated release Tuesday of a CIA report on interrogation techniques used on suspected al-Qaeda detainees held in secret facilities in Europe and Asia in the years after the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001. Many Washington power brokers believe the report will spur attacks against American interests.

In my second nonfiction book, The Clapper Memo, I reveal never-before-published details about interrogations conducted by Defense Intelligence Agency officials at Guantanamo Bay during the early days of the so-called “Global War On Terror.” In addition, I share details from my exclusive interviews with the men who used this highly-effective technology to interrogate members of Saddam Hussein’s inner circle (a.k.a., “The Deck of Cards”) as well as hundreds of al-Qaeda and Taliban terrorists and other detainees at locations around the world.

I also share details of how elite military and intelligence warfighters offered effuse praise for the technology — even after Clapper worked so hard to ban its use by Defense Department personnel while he was serving as Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence.

Learn more about this interrogation technology and how it, unlike waterboarding and other torture techniques, is touch-free and pain-free for those undergoing interrogations while producing superior results for interrogators.

Learn more about the reasons why, during a five-year period, members of our nation’s elite Special Forces units ignored no fewer than three Pentagon directives to stop using it.

Read some of the high-profile endorsements of the book.

Order a copy of The Clapper Memo. Thanks in advance!

If you like this article and my other efforts, please show your support by buying my books and encouraging your friends and loved ones to do the same.  Thanks in advance!

Click on image above to order Bob's books.

Click on image above to order Bob’s books.

Afghans in USA Missing After Vetting Process Fails Again

This morning, I came across a recent CBS News article about the disappearance of two Afghans who were in the United States to receive specialized training from the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration. Based on what I learned during a four-year investigation into the federal government’s use of credibility assessment technologies, including the polygraph, I believe Americans have reason to be concerned about these men.

Left to right: Mohd Naweed Samimi and Mohammad Yasin Ataye.

Left to right: Mohd Naweed Samimi and Mohammad Yasin Ataye.

Alarm bells began ringing in my mind after I read that, according to a DEA spokesperson cited in the article, Mohammad Yasin Ataye, 22, and Mohd Naweed Samimi, 24, were part of a group of 31 Afghan police officers participating in an intensive five-week training program to combat drug trafficking in Quantico, Va. Why? Because I learned long ago about the vetting process used to screen Afghans seeking positions with Afghan military, police and security agencies. It has worked so well that, during the seven years since Defense Department officials began keeping records of such attacks, 144 coalition members — mostly Americans — have been killed and 183 have been wounded [source] by supposedly-vetted individuals committing so-called “Green-on-Blue” attacks.

Click on image above to order book.

Click on image above to order book.

Alarm bells continued to sound off after I read the first sentence of the article’s fourth paragraph:  According to the DEA, each candidate is extensively vetted and polygraphed. A long line of Americans whose initial and continuing employment with federal government agencies (CIA, FBI, NSA et al) were subject to passing periodic polygraph examinations went on to be convicted of espionage against the United States. Most recently, Edward Snowden made the news for allegedly leaking a plethora of highly-classified intelligence data after passing polygraph exams.

To learn more about why I’m troubled by the disappearance of these Afghans, read The Clapper Memo. My second nonfiction book, it features never-before-published details obtained from top government officials, including individuals who interrogated members of Saddam Hussein‘s inner circle (i.e., “Deck of Cards”) and detainees at Guantanamo Bay. Plus, it has received rave reviews from some high-profile individuals.

To read other posts about The Clapper Memo, click here.

Click on image above to order Bob's books.

Click on image above to order Bob’s books.

DoD Still Keeping Best Vetting Technology From Warfighters

I’ve asked a lot of questions in recent years about the measures being employed to stop so-called “Green-on-Blue” attacks by members of the Afghan National Security Force against the U.S. and coalition personnel.  Two years ago today, I concluded that some — if not all — of the answers I had received from official U.S. and coalition spokespersons in Afghanistan were simply not true. Today, Defense Department leaders are keeping the best vetting technology on the market out of the hands of our nation’s warfighters.


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My conclusion stemmed from what I read in the first paragraph of TIME/World reporter John Wendle’s article published Sept. 4, 2012:

Alam Gul, a potential Afghan Local Police (ALP) recruit sat cross-legged on a mat outside the unit’s crumbling, mud-brick headquarters in the village of Tabin, in Kandahar’s restive Arghandab district, alternately looking at his hands and at the sky as he answered a series of questions.  Two ALP members sat watching nearby, while others washed motorbikes or lounged in the sun.  The U.S. Army specialist and staff sergeant in charge of the interview were getting increasingly frustrated with the young man.

The words in the final sentence of that paragraph revealed what the reporter interpreted was happening before his eyes.  At the same time, they ran counter to everything I had been told since April 4, 2012.

After I asked Army Lt. Colonel Jimmie E. Cummings about the process via which ANSF members are being vetted prior to working alongside U.S. and coalition forces, the International Security Assistance Force public affairs officer told me via email that “ISAF or U.S. are not responsible for vetting Afghans for either the Afghan National Army or Police. The Afghans use a 8-step process in vetting their candidates.”

Responding to similar questions July 4, Colonel Cummings reassured me nothing had changed and that Afghans were still in charge:

“We (ISAF) have today, just as we discussed back in April, advise the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) in assisting them to develop improvements to the overall vetting and recruitment process for the ANSF. The 8-step vetting process, which we have discussed in the past, is the result of our advising on this issue. Just like everything else that we (ISAF) advise on in Afghanistan, it is an ongoing and continuous process. We continually advise our Afghan partners on ways to improve processes. Again, the Afghans have the lead and are responsible for vetting their recruits into their security forces.”

On Aug. 23, Colonel Cummings’ replacement in Afghanistan, Air Force Maj. Lori Hodge, confirmed again via email that Afghans were in charge of vetting Afghans:

“In response to your question on the vetting procedures adopted by the Afghans, the Afghan National Security Force is working hard to make their vetting processes more robust.”

As examples of the measures being taken, the major listed the following:

The ANSF introduced re-vetting procedures for Afghan National Army soldiers returning from leave;

• The ANSF outlawed the sale of uniforms; and

• The ANSF established an anonymous reporting system.

Further, the major explained that Afghan President Hamid Karzai had issued a presidential decree which mandates that Afghan National Army recruits be interviewed by a four-person council consisting of officials from the Ministries of Defense and Interior as well as from the Afghan National Directorate of Security and medical department officials.

In closing, Major Hodge reiterated what I had been told by her predecessor and referred me to the Afghan MoD for further information on vetting procedures:

“While we advise our Afghan counterparts, the vetting of recruits and personnel is an Afghan-led and -owned process and they would be the appropriate authorities to discuss it in more detail.”

Maybe Wendle misinterpreted what was taking place before his eyes.  But I doubt it.

One thing I’m certain about is that Department of Defense leaders are still doing everything they can to keep the best vetting technology available out of the hands of our warfighters.

Be sure to tune in to Freedom 560 with Ken Clark Thursday afternoon at 1:30 p.m. Central Time. I’ll be talking with host Ken Clark about “Green-on-Blue” attacks, Rules of Engagement and other hot topics — many of which I tackle in my book, The Clapper Memo.  More details here.

To learn more about the The Clapper Memo and read some of the endorsements it has received, click here. To order a copy, click here.

Click on image above to order Bob's books.

Click on image above to order Bob’s books.

DoD Ban on Non-Polygraph Technology Continues

Almost 28 months ago, I came across a Military.com article about the Army telling Soldiers they could use only government-issued magazines with their M4 carbines.  In essence, they were told they could no longer — without violating orders, that is — use the widely-popular PMAG polymer M4 magazine manufactured by Magpul Industries Corp. Barely one month later, the ban was rescinded, according to this article, because it didn’t make sense. Now, it’s time to rescind another Defense Department ban on technology that doesn’t make sense.

I Company, 3rd Squadron, 2nd Cavalry Regiment live fire exercise 'Iron Anvil.' U.S. Army photo

I Company, 3rd Squadron, 2nd Cavalry Regiment live fire exercise ‘Iron Anvil.’ U.S. Army photo

In 2004, then-Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Stephen Cambone declared the polygraph the only credibility assessment tool authorized for use by DoD personnel, but it didn’t take.  They kept using one they liked, because it worked.

In 2007, then-Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence James R. Clapper Jr. issued a nearly-identical order, and it was largely ignored.

Only after a third ban was issued — this one by Admiral Eric T. Olson, then-commander of U.S. Special Operations Command, in 2008 — were all challengers to the polygraph finally cast adrift.

Why did it take DoD leaders three tries to make warfighters stop using their preferred non-polygraph credibility assessment technology? Because those warfighters refused to give up a tool they knew worked best — in places like Baghdad and Guantanamo Bay.

Want to learn more about the non-polygraph technology warfighters refused to stop using?  Details about it appear in my second nonfiction book, The Clapper Memo.

To learn more about the book and read some of the endorsements it has received, click here. To order a copy, click here.

Click on image above to order Bob's books.

Click on image above to order Bob’s books.