If Almost Nothing About Polygraph Remains to be Classified, Why Is DIA Stonewalling Me?

Officials at the National Center for Credibility Assessment, the federal government’s primary polygraph training agency, believe “there is almost nothing about the polygraph . . . that remains to be classified,” according to an article published today by McClatchy News. Apparently, however, officials at the Defense Intelligence Agency believe differently.

McClatchy Poly Article 1-15-14

Click image above to read article.

How do I know this? Because Wednesday marks the 18-month anniversary of my filing of a Freedom of Information Act request via which I hoped to obtain unclassified truths about the polygraph from DIA.

As I’ve reported in several pieces during the past year, the latest of which is this one, DIA officials have not only stonewalled my FOIA request of July 16, 2012, but they forced me to file an appeal to their refusal to comply with federal law by providing me with the unclassified information described below:

“…copies of any and all initial and follow-up contracts (i.e., solicitations, contracts, statements of work and task orders) related to the Portable Credibility Assessment Screening System (PCASS) or Preliminary Credibility Assessment Screening System (PCASS) that have been awarded by any Department of Defense Agency to Lafayette Instrument Company of Lafayette, Indiana, and any other contractors, academic institutions, laboratories and subcontractors from January 1, 2000, to present.”

Why am I so interested in these documents? Because I spent four years conducting an exhaustive investigation of activities inside the credibility assessment arena and, along the way, learned a lot about the players and how their actions over a period of more than 40 years have harmed national security. Think Edward Snowden, “Green-on-Blue” attacks in Afghanistan, and Guantanamo Bay.

PolygraphAmong those involved are academics, bureaucrats, polygraph examiners who seem beholden to a polygraph-only mindset and earned labels as “polygraph loyalists” in THE CLAPPER MEMO, the nonfiction book in which I share the findings of my investigation. In addition, there are the tight-lipped folks at Lafayette Instrument, the company mentioned in my FOIA request and the nation’s largest provider of polygraph equipment to the federal government, who have repeatedly turned down my requests for information. They are mentioned in my book as well.

Rather than reveal all I uncovered in THE CLAPPER MEMO, allow me to suggest you order a copy of the book that reveals what one retired Navy SEAL training program commander described as “an unconscionable cover-up” and what several other high-profile individuals have endorsed as well.

THE CLAPPER MEMO is available in paperback and ebook versions.

UPDATE 1/15/2014 at 4:57 p.m. Central:  After making several phone calls to the offices of my elected officials and to the DIA Office of the General Counsel, I received a message a short while ago from U.S. Rep. Ann Wagner (R-Mo.).  She informed me that she has “initiated an inquiry with the Defense Intelligence Agency” on my behalf.  Now, we wait a bit.

Bob McCarty is the author of Three Days In August (Oct '11) and THE CLAPPER MEMO (May '13). To learn more about either book or to place an order, click on the graphic above.

Bob McCarty is the author of Three Days In August (Oct ’11) and THE CLAPPER MEMO (May ’13). To learn more about either book or to place an order, click on the graphic above.

Army Polygraph Instructor Says He Purchased My Latest Book

It seems my latest nonfiction book, THE CLAPPER MEMO, has captured the attention of at least one polygraph loyalist inside the U.S. Army.  Early this afternoon, someone using the author name, “Keith,” visited the About Bob tab at BobMcCarty.com and left a comment which appears below unedited:


You cleary know alot about various “lie detectors” and this voice stress option really facinates me. Could you by any chance provide me with any cites in the scientific literature for peer reviewed, replicated studies on the accuracy of voice stress? I have found tons of peer reviewed material on polygraph (both pro and con), but I was unable to locate anything peer reviewed and replicated on voice stress.


By using the phrase, lie detector, and trying — while spelling it wrong — to use the word, fascinates, Keith came across as just another ordinary guy feigning interest in the subject matter at hand, right?  Not exactly.  Something I saw on my WordPress dashboard (i.e., the place where I moderate comments left by readers) told me more about Keith than he might have intended for me to know.

Next to his author name (see graphic below) and to the right of the IP address was the website URL, reverse.ncca.mil, through which his communications with my website had passed [FYI:  I blacked out Keith's email address.].

Keith Comment 1 9-19-13By simply eyeballing the URL, I recognized NCCA.mil as the website of the National Center for Credibility Assessment.  Located at Fort Jackson in Columbia, S.C., NCCA is the Department of Defense’s lead agency for all things polygraph and has been — under several different names — for six decades.  None of the professionals working at NCCA would use “lie detector” in place of polygraph.  After all, polygraph detects deception, not lies — or so they claim.

In response to Keith’s initial comment, and while knowing about his unmentioned affiliation with NCCA, I offered the kind of reply anyone should expect from an author in my shoes:

TheClapperMemoFrontCoverLR 6-5-13Read my latest nonfiction book, THE CLAPPER MEMO.  Nearly everything you ever wanted to know on the subject is in the book if, that is, you’re really searching for truth.

And our conversation continued:

KEITH:  Thanks Bob, I saw the book listed on Amazon. That is what led me to your site. On contraversal subjects I try to look at the science when I can. If the scientific citations I am looking for are in there, that would be fantastic.

Thanks again…

BOB:  Yes, it’s all in there, Keith. I hope you and your colleagues at the National Center for Credibility Assessment — yes, it shows up when you leave a comment — learn from it.

KEITH:  No problem, Bob. BTW, I am going to buy the book and if you don’t mind, will probably donate it to the NCCA library once I am done with it…

BOB:  Sounds good, Keith.

BOB:  By the way, is your name Keith Gaines and do you still serve as a polygraph instructor at NCCA?

KEITH:  Yes, I am still an instructor here. I have also done a bit of research, to include research into areas other then traditional polygraph testing. I have a strong interest in all areas of credibility assessment. The vehicle for getting there is not important if I can see it works.

Bob, I have looked at quite a bit of the literature on voice stress and I just can’t find anything that meets what is considered traditional replicated scientific tests for accuracy, reliability, etc for voice stress. I agree polygraph is contraversal (okay, an understatement), but at least there exists a fairly significant body of research. Look, I’m not attacking here, I’m just making an observation.

I did buy your book BTW, and I will read it, promise.

I wondered how long it would take before folks like Keith showed up on one of the virtual doorstep of one of my websites.  Hopefully, he and others at NCCA will read THE CLAPPER MEMO, comprehend its content, and take steps to do what’s best for our men and women in uniform — especially those facing the threat of “Green-on-Blue” attacks in Afghanistan.

To learn more, read the BASICS, then order a copy of THE CLAPPER MEMO.  It comes highly recommended.

NOTE TO KEITH:  Keith, controversial is spelled c-o-n-t-r-o-v-e-r-s-i-a-l.

Bob McCarty is the author of Three Days In August (Oct '11) and THE CLAPPER MEMO (May '13). To learn more about either book or to place an order, click on the graphic above.

Bob McCarty is the author of Three Days In August (Oct ’11) and THE CLAPPER MEMO (May ’13). To learn more about either book or to place an order, click on the graphic above.

Did Afghan Officials Play Deadly Role in Navy SEALs Helo Crash?

Could untrustworthy officials at the highest levels of the Afghan government be responsible for the single-largest loss of life in the history of U.S. Naval Special Warfare?   I’m convinced they are.

Extortion 17 Lives lostOn Aug. 6, 2011, a CH-47 “Chinook” — call sign “Extortion 17” — was shot down during the pre-dawn hours while on a mission to capture a bad guy in Afghanistan’s Wardak Province. Among the dead, 30 Americans, most of whom were members of the U.S. Navy’s elite SEAL TEAM SIX.

Because the deaths of these “quiet professionals” came only weeks after Vice President Joe Biden compromised operational security by disclosing details about their unit’s involvement in a raid on Osama bin Laden‘s compound in Pakistan, some people — including family members and friends of SEALs killed in the crash — believe the SEALs may have been sacrificed by the Obama Administration to appease followers of bin Laden. More likely, however, is that they were set up by unvetted or poorly-vetted Afghan officials allowed to work closely with U.S. and Coalition Forces decision-makers.

Is it beyond the realm of possibilities to think Afghan officials are corrupt enough to engage in such activities? Hardly According to a report issued last week by the Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction, the following is true:

Widespread corruption in Afghanistan is a significant problem and remains a threat to the success of reconstruction and assistance programs. In 2012, Transparency International ranked Afghanistan in a tie with Somalia and North Korea as the most corrupt country in the world. NOTE: Here’s the link to the 2012 Corruption Perceptions Index if you want to see it for yourself.

Fig 5 Insider Attacks on ISAF PersonnelThese are likely the same kind of people who, after surviving a supposedly-thorough vetting process, have excelled at waging hundreds of often-deadly “Green-on-Blue” or “Insider” attacks against American and Coalition Forces mentors and advisors while wearing the uniforms of their country’s military, police and security agencies instead of the attire of government officials.

Exactly who are the Afghans officials who likely set up the warriors aboard Extortion 17? Based on what I read among the more than 1,300 pages that make up the Extortion 17 crash investigation report produced by U.S. Central Command, I’d say its the high-level Afghans who serve on the Operational Coordination Group (OCG).

Early in the report, I found the transcript of a briefing conducted nine days after the crash by an American intelligence officer who, at one point, describes himself as “an SF guy by trade.” His audience is a group of about 18 people assembled at Bagram Air Base as part of the investigation process that followed the crash. The topic is the OCG’s participation in the war effort. NOTE: Because the copy of the report I received was redacted, the briefing officer’s branch of service and rank remain a mystery. His words from the transcript, however, appear below:

“We made some real money with the OCG; they are the Operational Coordination Group and they assist us with the planning, and the vetting, and de-confliction of our operation,” said the intelligence officer on page 6 of one 134-page document. “Likewise, once we are done executing the operation, they are able to send the results report, the result of the operations, up through their various administrates. They are made up of the Afghan National Army, the National Director of Security, as well as the Afghan National Police Force. They are here on site, but we also have them down at the regional level in RC-South and, in September, we are going to stand up region site up in RC-North.”

“So they have visibility on every operation?” asked the deputy investigating officer.

“Every operation,” the intel officer replied.

“So they knew about the operations?” the deputy asked, apparently wanting to confirm what he had just heard.

“Oh yea,” the intel officer confirmed.

“And they were briefed on it?” the deputy followed, again seeking confirmation.

“Absolutely,” came the reply.

OCG Slide pg 59 Screen shot 2013-09-15 at 11.53Further down the same page, the deputy investigating officer asked another OCG-focused question “So they have the ability, do they have approval authority on that, to cancel an operation?” and the conversation continued:

“Technically, they do,” the intel officer replied. “They don’t exercise it, but technically they do have (the) authority.”

“So they either task or approve the operation?” the deputy investigating officer said, seeking confirmation.

The answer: “Yep.”

More than 50 pages deeper into the document, the investigating officer — then-Brig. Gen. Jeffrey N. Colt before being promoted in 2012 — asked for and received confirmation from the officer representing the Joint Special Operations Task Force Intelligence Directorate (J3) that every mission is vetted through the OCG. He also received some background knowledge about the group.

“(The Operational Coordination Group),” the J3 representative told him and others in the room, “was formed over two years ago when we said we needed to have really better legitimacy in the eyes of (Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan) in order to maintain our freedom of maneuver. So, these guys are high level officials from Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Interior, and the National Directorate of Security.”

“Really the only thing we keep from them, obviously, is the (Top Secret) level how we got to the target piece of it,” he added a short time later. “They are briefed on all the targets prior to execution and, you know, technically speaking if they would come to us and say, ‘I don’t want you to execute this mission,’ we wouldn’t do it.”

So, according to transcript, members of the OCG knew about the Extortion 17 mission in advance, were involved in assigning and/or approving the mission and could have vetoed the mission, but did not.

After realizing how deeply involved OCG members are in each mission, I asked myself a question — “Did a failure to properly screen top Afghan government officials before they were allowed to serve on the OCG help bring down Extortion 17?” — and set out to answer it.


I began by searching online for accurate information about the OCG. Unfortunately, I found very little information about the group’s existence prior to the crash of Extortion 17. Even the International Security Assistance Force/NATO website contained no mentions of the OCG prior to the crash.

The only online mention of the OCG prior to the crash appeared in a Spring 2007 NATO Review article. In it, the author, British Army Gen. David Richards, described the introduction of the OCG as a “significant development.” NOTE: “Spring 2007″ is a lot earlier than the “two years ago” description (i.e., August 2009) given by the J3 officer as the approximate date of the OCG’s launch.

Eight months after the crash, a DoD news release did mention the OCG, stating that the group had been given the authority to review and approve all special operations missions and to participate in intelligence fusion, monitor mission execution and make notifications to provincial governors. Two months after that, an ISAF news release confirmed the same.


In addition to searching online, I submitted a list of questions to ISAF public affairs officers via email the morning of Sept. 11. I wanted to know when and why the OCG was established and who participates in the OCG or comprises its membership. Most importantly, I wanted to know if non-American and non-NATO individuals are vetted prior to their involvement in OCG and asked for a description of the vetting process if they are.

Two days later, the response I received from Lt. Col. Will Griffin, an Army public affairs officer assigned to ISAF Headquarters, was vague at best:

The OCG was established in 2010 to communicate ISAF Special Operations Forces headquarters’ intentions to our Afghan partners in an expedient and concise manner and likewise provide a means for Afghan National Security Force to convey their concerns and intentions to ISAF SOF HQ.

The OCG is comprised of representatives from coalition forces and Afghan liaison officers. All Afghan partners are screened and certified by their ministries, as well as completing the same verification process as all liaison officers that work in secure ISAF installations.

Ten minutes after reading Colonel Griffin’s response, I replied by pointing out to the colonel that he had not included a requested description of the vetting process used to screen non-American and non-NATO members of the OCG. Then I waited for another 15 hours. Rather than receive a description of the vetting process, however, I received the following message:

The vetting process is a comprehensive look at the individual’s background, associates, personal history, etc. Operational security considerations prevent me to go into further depth.

After Colonel Griffin offered little in terms of knowledge about the process used — if, in fact, there is one — to vet OCG members, I conducted a less-than-scientific survey of other sources, including friends and acquaintances who’ve spent varying lengths of time in Afghanistan and family members of American “Green-on-Blue” casualties. The general consensus: Afghans cannot be trusted.


Does this information prove, beyond a shadow of a doubt, that some Afghan members of the OCG are corrupt? No.

Does it prove that Afghan members of the OCG engaged in an effort to down Extortion 17? No.

Does it prove the OCG has been comprised by Afghans who may be subject to a vetting process that’s even less stringent than that the one used to screen entry-level policemen, security guards and soldiers? No.


What I can do, however, is encourage Americans to demand answers from their elected officials about Extortion 17 in much the same way they’re demanding answers to questions surrounding the deaths of four Americans at the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi, Libya.

BETRAYED New Book CoverIn addition, I can encourage Americans to purchase copies of the upcoming book, BETRAYED: Exposing the High Cost of the War on Terror, by Billy Vaughn. Along with his wife, Karen, the author of this book has spent a great deal of time and energy looking into the cause of the crash for one very personal reason: Extortion 17 was the final mission of their son, Navy SEAL Aaron Carson Vaughn.

While you wait for Billy Vaughn’s book, be sure to order copies of my two nonfiction books, Three Days In August (October 2011) and THE CLAPPER MEMO (May 2013). Both are available in paperback and ebook at Amazon.com. Thanks in advance!

Bob McCarty is the author of Three Days In August (Oct '11) and THE CLAPPER MEMO (May '13). To learn more about either book or to place an order, click on the graphic above.

Bob McCarty is the author of Three Days In August (Oct ’11) and THE CLAPPER MEMO (May ’13). To learn more about either book or to place an order, click on the graphic above.

Flawed Vetting Process Used In Afghanistan Tied to Intel Chief

A news release about THE CLAPPER MEMO, my latest nonfiction effort in which I expose flaws in the vetting process that have led to hundreds of American and Coalition Forces casualties in Afghanistan, has been distributed to more than 4,000 media outlets since 6:50 a.m. Eastern today. Now, it’s time for reporters to do their jobs.

News_Release_Screenshot_7-23-13Please encourage members of the news media as well as bloggers and citizen journalists to read the news release and the endorsements it contains, then ask them to read THE CLAPPER MEMO, interview me, and report the findings of my exhaustive four-year investigation.

Reporters who take those steps will realize the actions taken by James R. Clapper Jr., the man now serving as our nation’s top intelligence official, tie directly to the flawed vetting process that has resulted in hundreds of “Green-on-Blue (a.k.a., “Insider”) Attack” casualties in Afghanistan.

Copies of the book are available in ebook and paperback at Amazon.com.

Bob McCarty is the author of Three Days In August (Oct '11) and THE CLAPPER MEMO (May '13). To learn more about either book or to place an order, click on the graphic above.

Bob McCarty is the author of Three Days In August (Oct ’11) and THE CLAPPER MEMO (May ’13). To learn more about either book or to place an order, click on the graphic above.

Do Members of Congress Truly Care About Those in Uniform?

U.S. Sen. Carl Levin (D-Mich.) made headlines this week for criticizing Director of National Intelligence James R. Clapper Jr. for his role in the National Security Agency spy scandal for weeks now. If the long-time senator truly wants to know more about the nation’s top intelligence official, he should read the copy of THE CLAPPER MEMO I sent to him.

LtrFromSenCarlLevin6-4-13Soon after it was published in early May, I forwarded a copy of my latest nonfiction book, THE CLAPPER MEMO, to Senator Levin’s office on Capitol Hill. In a reply letter dated June 4, 203, Senator Levin thanked me for sending him a copy of the book, adding, “I appreciate you thinking of me.”

In reality, I wasn’t thinking of Senator Levin when I forwarded him a copy of my book. And I wasn’t thinking of Rep. Lamar Smith (R-Texas), Sen. Marco Rubio (R-Fla.) — both of whom replied (see Congressman Smith’s letter and Senator Rubio’s Do-Not-Reply email message below) — or any of the other elected officials who received copies of the book because of their standing as members of the House and Senate Armed Services and Intelligence Committees.

LtrFromCongLamarSmith_6-3-13 Email Reply from SenMarcoRubio 6-4-13

When I sent copies of THE CLAPPER MEMO, I was thinking of the hundreds of Americans who’ve been wounded or killed during “Green-on-Blue” or “Insider” attacks in Afghanistan as a result of the flawed vetting process used to screen Afghan recruits before they’re allowed to serve alongside American and Coalition Forces personnel. I’m not holding my breath waiting for members of Congress to do anything productive, but I hold out hope that Americans will let them know they side with me on this matter.

Read the endorsements and order THE CLAPPER MEMO.

Bob McCarty is the author of Three Days In August (Oct '11) and THE CLAPPER MEMO (May '13). To learn more about either book or to place an order, click on the graphic above.

Bob McCarty is the author of Three Days In August (Oct ’11) and THE CLAPPER MEMO (May ’13). To learn more about either book or to place an order, click on the graphic above.

News Articles About Polygraph Highlight Findings in Book

Months after McClatchy News published reporter Marisa Taylor‘s series, The Polygraph Files, she continues to provide fodder that supports the findings I share in my recently-released second nonfiction book, THE CLAPPER MEMO.

McClatchy Poly Article 1 - 5-20-13

Click to read about polygraph favoritism.

In one piece published today in the Miami Herald, Taylor points out the close ties between polygraph loyalists inside and outside the federal government. Among those mentioned in the article and in my book at the folks at Lafayette Instrument Company, the nation’s largest polygraph manufacturer, and at the American Polygraph Association, the world’s largest association of polygraph professionals.

In a second piece published in the same newspaper, Taylor points out a potentially-devastating glitch in the widely-used polygraph.

McClatchy Poly Article 2 - 5-20-13

Click to read about polygraph glitch.

Both of Taylor’s findings support my contention that a win-at-all-cost “turf war” against any and all challengers to their technology has been waged by polygraph loyalists for more than 40 years against any. Further, Taylor’s articles support my findings that the reliance of the federal government — and, in particular, the Department of Defense — on the polygraph has resulted in U.S. military and intelligence personnel facing higher-than-necessary risk of becoming casualties in places like Afghanistan.

I highly recommend you read all of Taylor’s reports mentioned above and, afterward, suggest you order a copy of my book, THE CLAPPER MEMO. When you do, you’ll learn never-before-published details about the turf war and its connection to “Green-on-Blue” or “Insider” attacks in Afghanistan.

THE CLAPPER MEMO is available in paperback and ebook versions from Amazon.


UPDATE 5/21/2013 at 11:36 a.m. Central: The U.S. government has pledged $23 million to help improve security and fight drug trafficking and other crimes in the eastern Caribbean region. Among other things, according to this report, the money will be used in part for training and to buy polygraph equipment.

Order Books Graphic LR 6-15-13

Bob McCarty is the author of Three Days In August and THE CLAPPER MEMO. To learn more about either book or to place an order, click on the graphic above.

ISAF Officials Tout Portable Polygraph as ‘Key Component’ Against ‘Insider Threats’

Imagine my surprise this morning when, less than two weeks after the release of my new book, THE CLAPPER MEMO, International Security Assistance Force officials issued public statements regarding the alleged effectiveness of portable polygraph devices in Afghanistan.

ISAF PCASS Story on Facebook 5-14-13First known as the Portable Credibility Assessment Screening System and later changed to Preliminary Credibility Assessment Screening System, this portable polygraph technology was deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq for the first time in 2008. One year later, DoD officials stonewalled me for nearly a month after I asked questions about the effectiveness of PCASS during its first year in operations. The stonewalling led me to launch an investigation that would result in publication of THE CLAPPER MEMO early this month.

As of this posting, the ISAF announcement (shown in the graphic above and as text below) appears online only as a status update — but not as a news release, per se — published this morning on the ISAF Facebook page:

Screening System Partnership Helps Identify Insider Threats

KABUL, AFGHANISTAN (May 14, 2013) – A US Department of Defense screening tool that helps assess the truthfulness of individuals is being lauded as a key component of Afghan and US efforts to preemptively identify and neutralize potential insider threats.

In a program that began in late 2012, US Forces-Afghanistan is training Afghanistan Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior personnel to use the Preliminary Credibility Screening System tool to assess people during security screenings.

The PCASS consists of physiological sensors, a small computer, specialized software and a testing procedure that can render an initial assessment of the truthfulness of individuals. Combined with other assessments, the PCASS significantly increases the ability to quickly identify potential threats before they act.

Two Afghan women from the MoI recently completed the training program, which expands the reach of the program by allowing female security personnel to screen female subjects while abiding by Afghan cultural custom.

Crucially, the announcement ignores the “elephant in the room” that is the hundreds of casualties resulting from “Green-on-Blue/Insider” attacks on U.S. and coalition troops during the past six years and, more precisely, during the five years since the initial deployment of 94 PCASS units to Afghanistan and Iraq at a reported cost of $7,500 each. If PCASS works so well, why have so many of these attacks taken place?

In addition, the ISAF announcement ignores what I learned from interrogators with vast experience in hostile environments.

Rather than laud PCASS as ISAF officials have done, a Green Beret I interviewed shortly after his retirement from the Army told me Special Forces operators would “rather go back to the stubby pencil and taking an educated guess” than use PCASS. In addition, the combat veteran — identified in the book only as “Joe” for security reasons — offered more words quite damning of PCASS which I share below in an excerpt from THE CLAPPER MEMO:

One of the major flaws in the technology that cause Joe and others to discount PCASS can be found in polygraph training, Joe said, that involves mock scenarios where subjects are given roles to play prior to undergoing a polygraph exam.

“If you can trick yourself into thinking you’re a bomber,” Joe said, referring to a 2006 PCASS study conducted at Fort Jackson, “then why can’t you trick yourself into thinking you’re not and trick that machine?”

Because Joe used an alternative to PCASS to set a record by conducting approximately 500 interrogations of enemy combatants, suspected terrorists, criminal suspects and third-country nationals seeking employment on U.S.-manned installations while he was stationed in Iraq, Kuwait and Qatar, I tend to believe him more than I do the many government bureaucrats with whom I spoke during the past four years.

I also tend to believe a former member of the Navy SEALs who spoke with me on the condition I not reveal his identity. He cited the memo that deemed the polygraph the only authorized credibility assessment tool for use by DoD personnel — and inspired the title for my book — as a contributing factor in his decision to retire from the military much earlier than he could have. And that wasn’t all he said.

When it comes to the bureaucrats who forced warfighters like him to stop using the non-polygraph alternative that had proven so effective in the field, he said they “should face charges and do time” for their actions.

RELATED: Coincidence or not, this new development surfaced only five days after the Defense Intelligence Agency responded to a PCASS-related Freedom of Information Act request I submitted almost 10 months ago!

To learn the “rest of the story,” order a copy of THE CLAPPER MEMO in paperback or ebook versions from Amazon.

Order Books Graphic LR 6-15-13

Bob McCarty is the author of Three Days In August and THE CLAPPER MEMO. To learn more about either book or to place an order, click on the graphic above.