In an article yesterday, I shared my concerns about Director of National Intelligence James R. Clapper Jr.‘s strategy of adding one more question to employee polygraph exams as a way to stop leaks of national security information. Today, despite the fact that I’ll cover this topic in great detail in my upcoming book, The CLAPPER MEMO, I could not resist bringing to the forefront one conclusion published in a 2003 National Academy of Science-funded study, “The Polygraph and Lie Detection”:
Polygraph testing yields an unacceptable choice for DOE employee security screening between too many loyal employees falsely judged deceptive and too many major security threats left undetected. Its accuracy in distinguishing actual or potential security violators from innocent test takers is insufficient to justify reliance on its use in employee security screening in federal agencies.
Little has changed in the field of polygraph technology since 2003, so why does Clapper continue to rely upon the technology that was so thoroughly discredited by the NAS study and, as a result, is doomed to fail? I’ll explore that question and many others in The CLAPPER MEMO, set for release this fall.
To learn more about the book and consider becoming part of an unconventional effort to publish it, visit http://TheClapperMemo.com.